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has only to pay 6 per cent interest upon his judgment debt while he
can earn a better return on his money in the open market."' 5 2
CPLR 5015(b): Amendment to allow vacatur by mere stipulation.
CPLR 5015(b) has been amended to permit a default judgment to
be vacated by the clerk, without application to the court, whenever the
parties so stipulate. There is no time limit on such a stipulation.
A TricE

57-

APPEALS TO THE APPELLATE DIVISION

CPLR 5704(a): Review of ex parte orders by appellate division.
CPLR 5704(a) has been amended to authorize the appellate division to vacate or modify an ex parte order granted by any court from
which an appeal to the appellate division would lie, and to issue an ex
parte order or provisional remedy if it is refused by any such court. 153
Under the former CPLR 5704(a), the appellate division was authorized
to vacate or modify an ex parte order of the supreme court only, and
could grant an ex parte order or provisional remedy only if it had been
refused by the supreme court.
ARTccLE 75 -

ARBITRATION

CPLR 7503(a): Mere conclusory allegationsin support of a stay of arbitration proceedings under MVAIC statute deemed insufficient.
-

The Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation 5 4
(MVAIC) was established to compensate innocent traffic victims or their
survivors for injuries or deaths sustained in accidents involving hit-andrun drivers or uninsured vehicles. 55 All motor vehicle liability insurers
authorized to do business in New York are members of the Corporation, 56 which is charged by statute with investigating claims and appearing on behalf of financially irresponsible motorists.' 5 7 Liability is
limited to $10,000 for injury or death of one person and $20,000 in the
event of an accident injuring two or more persons;' 5 8 no provision is
made for compensating property damage' 59
152 McLaughlin, New York Trial Practice, 168 N.Y.J. 8, July 13, 1972, at 1, col. 1.
153

L. 1972, ch. 435, at 909, eff. Sept. 1, 1972.

154 N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 167(2)(a), 600-26 (McKinney 1966).
155 Compulsory automobile insurance went into effect in New York on Feb. 1, 1957

(N.Y. Vms. & TR, . LAw art. 6 (McKinney 1960)). This legislation did not provide compulsory insurance for accidents involving uninsured nonresident drivers, hit-and-run
drivers, those driving stolen vehicles or vehicles operated without consent, and vehicles
whose insurers disclaimed liability or denied coverage.
156 N.Y. INs. LAW § 602 (McKinney 1966).
'57 Id. § 609.
1 Id. § 610.

19 For a discussion of the general background of MVAIC and the problems of the
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The standard uninsured motorist endorsement requires arbitration in the event of disagreement as to the right of recovery or amount
of damages. The New York Court of Appeals, in Rosenbaum v. American Surety Co. of New York, 160 was faced with the question of whether
a determination as to the status of a vehicle as insured or uninsured
should be made by an arbitrator or by a court prior to the commencement of arbitration proceedings. The majority, in a 4-3 decision, ruled
that under the arbitration provision only two issues were made arbitrable - that as to fault and that as to damages should fault be established. 161 Thus, the Court ordered a jury trial "of the preliminary issue
of fact as to whether the plaintiff's decedent was struck by an uninsured
automobile."1 62
The dissenting judges in Rosenbaum maintained that the provision in the uninsured motorist endorsement for arbitration of the
"matter or matters" of disagreement was sufficiently broad to cover all
aspects of whether the claimant was entitled to recover. The dissenters
argued:
We should not read into that agreement a provision for piecemeal
treatment of a specified area of dispute by two separate and distinct
procedures. If we do so, we will be adding a new type of cause to an
already overburdened court calendar with its attendant delay, personal effort and financial burden... 163
The Rosenbaum decision limiting arbitration to issues of fault and
damages has apparently given rise to some of the difficulties anticipated
by the minority opinion in its warning against a piecemeal approach. In
New York County, motions by insurance companies have become so
numerous that it is impractical to hold the immediate trial on factual
uninsured motorist, see Laufer, Embattled Victims of the Uninsured: In Court with New
York's MVAIC, 1959-1969, 19 BurFALo L. Ray. 471 (1970); Smith, Handling Uninsured
Motorist Claims in New York, 32 ALBANY L. Rzv. 96 (1967); Ward, New York's Motor
Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation: Past, Present and Future, 8 BurFALo L.
Rzv. 215 (1959); Ward, The Uninsured Motorist: National and International Protection
Presently Available and Comparative Problems in Substantial Similarity, 9 BUrnAio L.
REv. 283 (1960); Note, The Problem of the FinanciallyIrresponsible Motorist-New York's
MVAIC, 65 CoLurm. L. REv. 1075 (1965); Note, MVAIC Six Years Later-A Practical

Appraisal, 39 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 321 (1965).
160 11 N.Y.2d 310, 183 N.E.2d 667, 229 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1962).

161 The majority in Rosenbaum argued that the arbitration clause was particular, not
general, and stressed the rule that no one is under a duty to arbitrate unless he has so
agreed in unambiguous language. The status of the opposing motorist was held to be a

condition precedent to arbitration and therefore properly a matter for the trial court prior
to the commencement of arbitration proceedings.
162 11 N.Y.2d at 313, 183 N.E.2d at 668, 229 N.Y.S.2d at 377.
163 Id. at 316, 183 N.E.2d at 670, 229 N.Y.S.2d at 379-80 (dissenting opinion). Before

Rosenbaum, the judicial departments were divided in their treatment of the scope of the
arbitration clause. The First Department, in MVAIC v. Velez, 14 App. Div. 2d 276, 220
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issues which the arbitration statute (CPLR 7503) contemplates, and
there is currently an eighteen-month delay. 16 4
The issue most frequently raised by insurance companies on these
motions to stay arbitration is whether the vehicle which injured the
claimant was in fact uninsured. Some insurance companies routinely
make a motion for a stay of arbitration, arguing that a hearing must be
ordered if the claimant's proof of noninsurance is not conclusive. In
Aetna Insurance Co. v. Logue,16 5 the Supreme Court, New York County,
recently observed:
It is easy to see the difficulties that a claimant faces in proving the
negative proposition that the stranger whose car hurt him was not
insured, particularly as the case cannot involve a great deal of
money and the lawyers for the claimant simply cannot make an
exhaustive investigation excluding every possibility of insurance. 166
The critical question for the courts is deciding how to apportion
the burden of proof in determining whether to order an evidentiary
trial of the preliminary issues relating to the right of arbitration. Under
Rosenbaum, if such preliminary issues are demonstrated, arbitration
must be stayed. A number of decisions 67 have dismissed mere conclusory allegations by insurance companies which challenged a claimant's
proof as being insufficient without introducing contrary evidence.
With respect to a different preliminary issue, the Appellate Division, First Department, in Fuscaldo v. MVAIC, 68 held that MVAIC,
in seeking a stay of arbitration, must show with evidentiary proof that
a factual issue exists. In Fosterv. MVAIC, 169 the Supreme Court, New
N.Y.S.2d 954 (1st Dep't 1961) (per curiam), held that all issues relating to recovery under
an uninsured motorist endorsement were to be settled by the arbitrator. Cases following
the Velez holding include McCarthy v. MVAIC, 16 App. Div. 2d 35, 224 N.Y.S.2d 909 (4th
Dep't 1962), aff'd mem., 12 N.Y.2d 992, 188 N.E2d 405, 238 N.Y.S.2d 101 (1963); Application
of Zurich Ins. Co., 14 App. Div. 2d 669, 219 N.Y.S.2d 748 (Ist Dep't 1961) (per curiam);
MVAIC v. Kirby, 12 App. Div. 2d 739, 208 N.Y.S.2d 1010 (Ist Dep't 1961) (per curiam);
Steinitz v. MVAIC, 33 Misc. 2d 228, 225 N.Y.S.2d 147 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1962).
The Second Department, in MVAIC v. Lucash, 16 App. Div. 2d 975, 230 N.Y.S.2d 262
(2d Dep't 1962) (mem.), and the Third Department, in Application of Phoenix Assur.
Co., 9 App. Div. 2d 998, 194 N.Y.S.2d 770 (3d Dep't 1959) (mem.), held that arbitration
should be limited to the issue of negligence and the resulting question of damages. This
position was subsequently adopted by the Court of Appeals in Rosenbaum.
164 Aetna Ins. Co. v. Logue, 68 Misc. 2d 841, 843, 328 N.Y.S.2d 569, 572 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.

County 1972).
166 Id. 841, 328 N.Y.S.2d 569.
166 Id. at 843, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 572-73.
167 E.g., O'Brien v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 33 App. Div. 2d 1085, 307 N.Y.S.2d 689 (3d
Dep't 1970); Highsmith v. MVAIC, 31 App. Div. 2d 424, 298 N.Y.S.2d 648 (4th Dep't 1969);
Kuhn v. MVAIC, 31 App. Div. 2d 707, 295 N.Y.S.2d 864 (3d Dep't 1968); Beakbane v.
IVAIC, 20 App. Div. 2d 736, 246 N.Y.S.2d 843 (3d Dep't 1964) (mem.).
168 24 App. Div. 2d 744, 263 N.Y.S.2d 919 (1st Dep't 1965) (per curiam).
169 55 Misc. 2d 784, 286 N.Y.S.2d 775 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1967).
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York County, initially noted "that claimant is neither assisted by any
presumption of noninsurance nor is he burdened by any contrary presumption of insurance." 17 The court further held that the claimant
must establish the noninsured status of the other vehicle by a fair preponderance of the evidence, and that, in the instant case, the claimant's
presentation was strengthened by the failure of MVAIC to in any way
controvert his evidence.
Aetna Insurance Co. v. Logue 7 1 is the most recent decision to at-

tempt to reconcile the need for an expeditious resolution of the issues
with the strict construction placed on the arbitration statute in Rosenbaum. The court proposed reasonable guidelines to determine when a
genuine factual issue calling for resolution under CPLR 7503(a) exists:
Arbitration should be stayed and at least an evidentiary hearing ordered where:
(a) claimant does not present some reasonably persuasive evidence of noninsurance (or other basis for invoking the arbitration
clause); or
(b) claimant has failed diligently to try to ascertain the facts,
within the practical limitations of the situation, or to follow up
some reasonable indication of insured status; or
(c) the insurance company presents some evidence that the offending vehicle is insured.
Arbitration should be directed, without ordering an evidentiary hearing, in the converse situation ....172
The Logue guidelines would end a confusing and inconsistent approach to an increasingly serious problem, reduce court congestion, and
encourage faster and fairer settlements.
CPLR 7503(a): Statute applied in conjunction with waiver doctrine
precludes all remedies in arbitrablecontroversy.
An agreement which calls for an exclusive remedy in arbitration
binds all parties to the extent that no judicial remedy may be sought
which would affect this contractual right. CPLR 7503(a) supplies a
means of enforcing such an agreement by providing for a stay of a
judicial action involving an issue arbitrable under its terms.
In Sowalskie v. Cohoes Housing Authority, Inc.,173 the defendant
sought a stay under CPLR 7503 on the basis of the parties' agreement
to settle all disputes by arbitration. Additionally, the defendant argued
that by commencing an action to foreclose a mechanic's lien, the plain170 Id. at 786, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 778.

17168 Misc. 2d 841, 328 N.Y.S.2d 569 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1972).
172 Id. at 846-47, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 575-76.
173 69 Misc. 2d 665, 30 N.Y.S.2d 481 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1968).

